This paper employs a LEN-model with multiple tasks and multiple agents to investigate the decision of how to assign the responsibility for synergistic tasks in an environment with an aggregate performance measure. Considering task assignment as an endogenous variable, we develop a simultaneous solution for the optimal task assignment and the managers' compensation characterized by the variable pay ratio (i.e., variable pay in relation to total pay). We show that in addition to risk, the optimal task assignment is determined by congruency considerations and interactions between the managers' tasks (i.e., synergies).
INTRODUCTION "The intensity of incentives increases with the degree of responsibility."
Stern Stewart, 2008. In this paper, we investigate the optimal assignment of synergistic tasks in an agency setting and determine the variable pay ratio (i.e., the proportion of variable compensation either in relation to fixed pay or in relation to total compensation) as a characterization of optimal compensation contracts. Firms seem to rely on simple rules when compensating their managers. Frequently, a manager's compensation can be split up into a fixed salary (base pay) and a performance-based variable (or bonus) part. The variable pay ratio (VPR) is often used by firms to characterize the incentive pay of managers at different hierarchical and responsibility levels. Prevalently, the VPR increases with a manager's degree of responsibility and the level of base pay. For example, the consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co. identifies a VPR of 50 percent for plant managers and a VPR of 150 percent for top managers. Compensation structures seem furthermore to be influenced by the type and number of tasks a manager is responsible for. Task assignment, in turn, is determined by several factors. The first group of factors is related to the production process, e.g., task synergies and complementarities which can be exploited when assigning similar or diverse tasks to the same manager (Hughes et al., 2005) . The second type of factors is connected to performance measurement, e.g., risk (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) and congruency considerations (Itoh, 2001) . Finally, there is a group of factors related to the managers which are held responsible for the tasks. Team performance (Itoh, 1994) and social interaction between team -2- 4 Indjejikian and Nanda (1999) use the term consolidated responsibility for the generalist. 5 See, e.g., Hughes et al. (2005) for this and several other examples.
members caused by, e.g., social norms (Fischer and Huddart, 2008) , as well as a manager's past performance (Indjejikian and Nanda, 1999) can have an impact on task assignment. Empirically, a tendency to assign individuals to handle multiple tasks (Zhang, 2003) and to assign diverse tasks to a single manager (Hughes et al., 2005) can be observed. Since task assignment is considered as being an indicator for the degree of responsibility (Prendergast, 1995) it should thus also impact a manager's VPR.
Based on the previous considerations, our paper provides answers to the following research questions.
First, what is the optimal allocation of synergistic tasks? We investigate this question in an environment with a parsimonious accounting system that generates only one aggregate performance measure (see, e.g., Itoh, 1994) , where the performance measure does not capture the synergies between tasks. Second, what is a manager's optimal VPR and to what extent is task assignment relevant for the VPR? Consider an environment where agents can be classified as specialists and generalists according to the number and type of tasks they perform. A specialist is responsible for only a few, similar tasks, while a generalist performs a wide variety of tasks (Crowston, 1997; Daft, 2001; Indjejikian and Nanda, 1999) . 4 We investigate the question of whether the VPR for a specialist varies with his co-worker's type, i.e., other specialists or generalists, and how the assignment of synergistic tasks to his co-workers influences his own VPR.
Seemingly, a majority of firms uses higher VPRs for managers with higher degrees of responsibility.
Furthermore, there are large differences in the VPRs of top managers and lower-level managers. With respect to task assignment, the prevailing view seems to favor diverse task assignment over similar task assignment to exploit complementarities, e.g., firms assign tasks related to credit review and loan pricing to the same person rather than assigning tasks on the same stage in the credit-granting process to a single person.
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Our work is closely related to two streams of literature. The first stream considers task assignment in general and in the presence of spillovers and externalities. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) analyze a setting with two non-symmetric agents who devote different amounts of total attention to tasks. They -3-find that tasks should be grouped into jobs in such a way that the two most easily measured tasks are assigned to one agent while the remaining two tasks are assigned to the other agent. Hemmer (1995) accounts for synergies between tasks and finds that a team organization, where all agents are responsible for all tasks is preferred over an assembly line organization, where each agent is responsible for a single task, since this form induces cooperation and internalizes spillovers between tasks. Besanko et al. (2005) investigate the question of how to organize a multi-product firm in a multi-task environment. They find that an organization around functional areas rather than product lines is preferred even if the accounting system only provides measures of product-line profits. Zhang (2003) as well as Hughes et al. (2005) consider production externalities in their settings and analyze the trade-off between similar or diverse task assignment and the fine-tuning of incentives. They find that the beneficial effects of complementarities to justify diverse task assignment must exceed the opportunity cost of an inability to fine-tune incentives.
In their model, the performance measure is altered with the type of task assignment selected by the firm.
Finally, Dikolli et al. (2009) investigate the effect of interrelated performance measures and effort interactions on a manager's compensation contract. They find that the nature of interactions affects the weights placed on various performance measures.
The second stream of literature deals with task assignment against the background of the informativeness of performance measures. Indjejikian and Nanda (1999) analyze a two-period model to explore the impact the ratchet effect has on managerial incentives. They find that the use of more aggregate performance measures and greater consolidation of responsibility, i.e., employing generalists rather than specialists, helps mitigate the ratchet effect. Nikias et al. (2005) investigate whether a principal prefers disaggregate or aggregate performance measures of two interdependent tasks. They find that disaggregation would only be preferred if sufficiently negative task complementarities are present. Corts (2007) investigates individual versus team performance measures. In his setting, the allocation of tasks serves to alter the richness of the signals available for the agent. In contrast to Holmström and Milgrom (1991) he finds that it may be optimal to share poorly measured tasks among several agents.
Finally, Fischer and Huddart (2008) analyze the impact of social norms on incentive contracting and organizational form and show that social pressure can be valuable to separate tasks.
Our paper can be classified as being at the interface of the two streams and we contribute to the -4-literature in several ways. We consider task assignment as an endogenous variable and develop a simultaneous solution for task assignment and optimal compensation contracts. Furthermore, we extend Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and show that in addition to risk considerations, the optimal task assignment depends on the interrelation of task interaction (synergies) and congruency issues. We extend Hughes et al. (2005) and show that in addition to synergies, the congruency of the aggregate performance measure is influencing the principal's preferences over similar or diverse task assignment. We employ the LEN-model for the analysis in order to directly derive the VPR as a ratio of (expected) variable pay in relation to total pay. Finally, we show that a manager's VPR does not only depend on the number and type of tasks he performs, but also on the other managers' compensations and on how tasks are assigned to these managers.
We find that the optimal task assignment depends on the interaction of risk, congruency issues, and task synergies. Hence, optimal assignment of responsibility depends on the interaction of the production function, the managers' characteristics, and the performance measure properties. Specifically, we identify three factors influencing the VPR of a manager in a setting with an aggregate performance measure: first, the VPR of a manager is influenced by the number and type (synergistic or non-synergistic) of tasks the manager performs, second, it depends on the other managers' compensation, and third, the task assignment within the team has an impact on a manager's VPR.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the basic model structure. Sections 3 and 4 characterize two main task assignment options and the respective optimal incentive contracts and VPRs. Section 5 develops the optimal task assignment and describes the impact of task assignment on the VPRs of managers. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
MODEL DESCRIPTION

Performance Measures and Task Assignment
We consider a single-period model in which a risk-neutral firm (principal) hires up to three riskaverse managers (agents, j ' 1,2,3) to provide personally costly effort, a i > 0, a i 0 ú, i ' 1,2,3, in return for compensation w j . For illustration purposes, the firm is organized along three functions (e.g., procurement, production, and sales) and has recently introduced a new product all the functions must be 7 The case of hiring a single agent to perform all of the three tasks is excluded for simplicity reasons.
performed for. Each agent is capable of exerting effort on any of the three tasks related to the new product. The procurement and production tasks (i.e., tasks a 1 and a 2 ) are assumed to be associated with synergies. The principal's payoff is given by
where b i 0 ú represents the productivity of the agents' effort a i and 0 #γ < 1 reflects the task interaction associated with the two tasks a 1 and a 2 . 6 If the principal hires three agents, each agent performs a single task (τ ' specialized task assignment, s). With two agents, the principal uses a form of mixed task assignment, with one agent being responsible for two tasks and one agent exerting effort on a single task.
With mixed task assignment, one reasonable way is to assign the synergistic tasks to the same agent, i.e., one agent performs tasks a 1 and a 2 (τ ' bundled task assignment, b). The second alternative with mixed task assignment is to assign a synergistic and a non-synergistic task to the same agent, i.e., one agent performs tasks a 2 and a 3 (τ ' unbundled task assignment, u).
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Agents bear a private monetary cost of effort. The effort cost of task i ' 1,2,3 is assumed to be quadratic with ½ a i 2 . Agent j's effort cost κ j (a 1 , a 2 ,a 3 , τ), τ ' s,b,u, depends on the tasks assigned to this agent. We assume that it is additive in the individual task's costs and independent of the type of tasks assigned to this agent.
We assume that the payoff x is not contractible and incentives must be based on an imperfect aggregate signal of the agents' efforts
where m i represents the sensitivity of the performance measure with respect to the agents' effort level and g ~ N(0,1) is a normally distributed noise term reflecting random events beyond the agents' control. The scale of the performance measure is arbitrary. Hence, we scale it to have unit variance. Also, we assume that the metric's variance does not change with the assignment of tasks to the agents. Furthermore, we assume that productivities (b i ) and sensitivities (m i ) do not vary with the type of agent the tasks are performed by, i.e., whether a single-or a two-task-agent performs the respective task.
Incentive Contracts, Agents' and Principal's Preferences
The principal offers the agents linear incentive contracts z j ' (f j ,v j ), where f j is agent j's fixed wage and v j is the incentive rate for the contractible performance measure. We restrict compensation to be linear in signals, i.e.,
We assume that the agents' preferences are represented by a negative exponential utility function, with
where r is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, which is identical for all agents due to symmetry.
Maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent, which is characterized by
When the principal offers incentive contract z j to the agents, she has to take into account that the agents can decide whether to accept the contract (CE j $ 0) and that the agents choose the level of effort that maximizes their certainty equivalent. The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral with respect to the terminal value (x) of the firm. Furthermore, she is assumed to be interested in maximizing the expected profit from production, procurement, and sales of the new product net of the agents' compensation.
The principal's optimization problem is characterized by
arg max
The principal maximizes her expected payoff less the compensation paid to the agents subject to meeting the agents' participation constraints (2a), which are assumed to be binding in equilibrium, and the agents' incentive compatibility constraints (2b). From the principal's optimization problems it is straightforward that there exists a trade-off between the impact of an incongruent performance measure and the riskpremium paid to the agents. If only risk premiums are considered, the principal prefers hiring the smallest possible number of agents. If only congruency problems are taken into account, the principal prefers -7-hiring a single agent for each task in order to fine-tune incentives. By additionally considering the impact of γ, we can explore the impact of assigning synergistic tasks to the same or to different agents.
SPECIALIZED TASK ASSIGNMENT
Optimal Contract
In the case of specialized task assignment (τ ' s), the principal hires three agents to perform the three tasks related to the new product. Hence, the principal has to deal with three single-task incentive problems. The agents choose a i to maximize their certainty equivalent which results in the following characterization of the agents' action choice obtained by differentiating the incentive constraints given in (2b) with respect to a i
The agents' optimal effort choice is a linear function of the variable part of total compensation. The agents' fixed salaries follow from setting (1) equal to zero (based on (2a)), and solving for f j , j ' 1,2,3.
Substituting the latter plus the agents' optimal action choices back into the principal's optimization problem (2) and differentiating with respect to variable components of the agents' compensation yields the optimal incentive rates with specialized task assignment, i.e.,
where
. The incentive rate on task a 3 is a standard result in agency theory. Note that for γ ' 0, the optimal variable compensation for inducing tasks a 1 and a 2 reduces to the standard result as well. The weights on y for one synergistic task (a 1 or a 2 ) increases in the sensitivity of the performance measure with respect to the effort of the agent performing the other synergistic task (e.g., Mv 1 s † /Mm 2 > 0) and it increases in the level of synergy (e.g., Mv 1 s † /Mγ > 0). If the sensitivity of the performance measure with respect to the second agent's effort increases, the principal will induce higher effort from the second agent which increases the marginal benefit of inducing a 1 . Observe that synergies lead to interdependent incentive problems for the first and the second agent.
-8-The principal's payoff with specialized task assignment is given by
From equation (3), the principal's expected net payoff increases in the degree of task interaction γ between tasks a 1 and a 2 .
Optimal VPR
In a next step, we calculate the VPR as a characterization of the optimal incentive contract. The VPR is defined as the relation of variable pay to total pay, i.e.,
The realization of performance measure y and the fixed wages f j τ † are determined by considering the agents' optimal effort choices a i † and the optimal incentive rates v j τ † .
With specialized task assignment, the respective VPRs for the three agents are given by
We describe the VPRs still dependent on the optimal variable compensation of the three agents in order to emphasize two characteristics of the optimal VPRs. First, the VPRs for all three agents are of identical structure, however, the VPRs for agent 1 and 2 differ significantly from the VPR of agent 3, since synergies are incorporated in v 1 s † and v 2 s † , but not in v 3 s † . Second, it is apparent that the VPR of one specialist depends on the variable compensation of the other specialists. This is explained by the use of a single, aggregate performance measure. In this case, the agents' fixed salary corrects for the mean effect in the performance measure. Motivating effort by other agents can then be considered as a positive externality.
When assuming identical agents and comparing the optimal VPRs, a specialist performing a synergistic task (a 1 ) receives a lower VPR than a specialist performing a non-synergistic task (a 3 ) if
With γ ' 0 this relation reduces to b 3 m 3 < b 1 m 1 . Hence, if the payoff productivity multiplied by the sensitivity of the performance measure with respect to the synergistic task are larger in relation to the same values for the non-synergistic task, the agent performing the synergistic task receives a lower VPR in relation to the agent responsible for the non-synergistic task. From the agents' optimal effort choice follows that higher payoff productivities and performance measure sensitivities induce a higher effort 9 The third alternative -assigning tasks a 1 and a 3 to the same agent -is structurally identical to the second alternative and thus omitted.
level. Hence, the principal can reduce the variable part of compensation. This is also consistent with the result, that the VPR decreases with the agent's own payoff productivity (i.e., MVPR 1 s /Mb 1 < 0) and increases with the other agent's payoff productivity (i.e., MVPR 1 s /Mb 3 < 0). With mixed task assignment, the principal hires two agents and has two options on how to assign the three tasks to them. Either she chooses to bundle the synergistic tasks by assigning tasks a 1 and a 2 to the same agent, or she unbundles the synergistic tasks and assigns tasks a 2 and a 3 to the same agent. 9 In the first case, we consider an intra-agent task interaction, while the second case represents an inter-agent task interaction. Similar to the previous section, the optimal actions follow from the agents' incentive compatibility constraints as
With bundling synergistic tasks (τ ' b), the principal motivates the first agent to exert effort on tasks a 1 and a 2 via v 1 , and induces effort on task a 3 with the incentive rate v 2 for the second agent. Substituting the agents' optimal fixed wage and optimal action choices into the principal's optimization problem and differentiating with respect to v 1 and v 2 yields the optimal incentive rates with mixed bundled task assignment, i.e.,
As before, the weight placed on the performance measure for motivating the synergistic tasks a 1 and a 2 increases in the level of synergies and the respective payoff productivities, while it decreases in the agents' risk aversion. Note that assigning the synergistic tasks to the same agent implies that the variable -10-compensation of the agent performing the non-synergistic task a 3 does not differ compared to the specialized task assignment, i.e., v 3 s † ' v 2 b † . The principal's expected payoff with bundling synergistic tasks amounts to
(b) Mixed Unbundling
With the second option of mixed task assignment, unbundling of synergistic tasks (τ ' u), the first agent performs task a 1 , while the second agent is responsible for tasks a 2 and a 3 . The optimization yields the following incentive rates
. Basic comparative statics remain the same, however, note that assigning synergistic tasks to different agents affects their variable compensation in comparison to the previous settings. Specifically, the single-task agent 1 in the mixed unbundling setting gets a different variable compensation as opposed to the single-task agent 1 in the specialized task assignment setting,
The principal's expected payoff with unbundling synergistic tasks is given by
Optimal VPR (a) Mixed Bundling
With τ ' b, the optimal VPRs for the two agents amount to ).
Examining in more detail the relation of the two VPRs to explore how the number of tasks performed impacts the VPRs yields -11-
The ratio RR b is smaller than 1 if identical payoff productivities and sensitivities are assumed. In this case, the agent performing the two synergistic tasks receives a lower VPR than the single-task agent.
Taking the first derivative with respect to γ gives MRR b /Mγ < 0. Increasing task synergy thus means that the VPR for the two-task agent is decreased relative to the VPR for the single-task agent.
Furthermore, as in the specialized task assignment case, both VPRs increase in the other agent's productivity and decrease in the agent's own productivity, i.e., 
(b) Mixed Unbundling
With τ ' u, the optimal VPRs for the two agents are given by
and
The ratio between the two VPRs amounts to
Here, RR u is larger than 1 in the case of identical payoff productivities and sensitivities. Similar to the previous result, the two-task agent receives a lower VPR than the single-task agent. Hence, with identical productivities and sensitivities, this result is independent of whether the two-task agent performs two synergistic tasks or a synergistic and a non-synergistic task. In general, however, interrelations of task assignment and VPRs exist.
With mixed unbundling task assignment, the impact of γ on RR u is not as evident as with bundling synergistic tasks, since the synergistic tasks are now assigned to different agents. However, the general comparative static result with respect to the agents' productivities still holds, i.e., MVPR 1 u /Mb 1 < 0 and MVPR 1 u /Mb 3 > 0.
-12-10 All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
OPTIMAL TASK ASSIGNMENT AND IMPACT ON THE VARIABLE PAY RATIO
Determinants of Optimal Task Assignment
In order to isolate the basic trade-off and the impact of risk, congruency, and synergies on task assignment, we compare the principal's expected payoff (3) to (5) In a first step (Lemma 1), we isolate the impact of synergies by considering the case of risk-neutral agents and identical payoff productivities and sensitivities for all tasks. In a second step (Lemma 2), we relax the assumption with respect to productivities and sensitivities and focus on the interaction of congruency issues with synergies by assuming risk-neutral agents. In a third step (Lemma 3), we consider the case of a perfectly congruent performance measure and no synergies to isolate the impact risk has on the principal's preferences about task assignment. For characterizing performance measure congruity we use the measure of noncongruity established by Feltham and Xie (1994) . Applied to our model, a performance measure is perfectly congruent if its two measures of noncongruity, λ 12 ' (b 1 m 2 ! b 2 m 1 ) 2 and
, and the level of synergies γ are equal to zero. In the two final steps (Lemmas 4a and 4b), we consider a partially congruent performance measure, i.e., congruent either with respect to tasks a 1 and a 2 (λ 12 ' 0 and γ ' 0) or with respect to tasks a 2 and a 3 (λ 23 ' 0 and γ ' 0) to explore the interaction of risk and congruency.
10
Lemma 1: Assuming risk-neutral agents as well as identical payoff productivities and sensitivities, the principal prefers bundling synergistic tasks or specialized task assignment over unbundling synergistic tasks:
The principal is interested in motivating tasks a 1 and a 2 in a similar way, since the product of these two tasks weighted with γ positively impacts the principal's expected payoff while effort costs rise -13-quadratically. The mixed bundling task assignment, where tasks a 1 and a 2 are performed by a single agent, as well as the specialized task assignment, where the principal can motivate each task separately, allow the principal to fine-tune incentives on the two synergistic tasks (absent congruency problems).
Hence, ignoring any costs associated with risk-premiums and congruency issues, these two task assignments dominate the mixed unbundling task assignment.
Lemma 2: Assuming risk-neutral agents, the principal prefers specialized task assignment over mixed task assignment:
If the risk premium is not relevant, only congruency issues have to be considered. In this case, the best way for the principal to adjust v 1 and v 2 in order to reflect task interaction and motivate task a 3 via v 3 separately is the specialized task assignment. The mixed task assignment is dominated since it either does not allow fine-tuning incentives with respect to tasks a 1 and a 2 (mixed bundling) or it implies not being able to motivate task a 3 separately (mixed unbundling.).
Lemma 3: Assuming a perfectly congruent performance measure for tasks a 1 and a 2 as well as for tasks a 2 and a 3 and neglecting synergies, the principal prefers mixed task assignment over specialized task assignment:
Without congruency problems and synergies, the principal takes into consideration only risk-premium effects. In this case, the principal is better off with the mixed task assignments, where she only pays two risk-premiums as opposed to the specialized task assignment with three risk-premiums. Whether the principal prefers bundling or unbundling synergistic tasks depends on the relation of the respective payoff productivities (or sensitivities). With b 1 > b 3 (or m 1 > m 3 ), the principal prefers bundling synergistic tasks.
In this case, the principal benefits from motivating effort on task a 1 and can provide stronger incentives at lower cost with bundling tasks a 1 and a 2 .
-14-Lemma 4a: Assuming a perfectly congruent performance measure for tasks a 1 and a 2 and absent synergies, the principal prefers bundling tasks a 1 and a 2 strictly over specialized task assignment:
If there are no congruency issues associated with tasks a 1 and a 2 , assigning them to one agent is not detrimental and the principal benefits from paying less risk-premium with bundling them in the mixed task assignment than with the specialized task assignment. Since the congruency problem between tasks a 2 and a 3 is still present, the principal's preference of mixed task assignment with bundling tasks a 1 and a 2 over mixed task assignment with unbundling tasks a 1 and a 2 depends on the severity of this remaining congruency problem.
Lemma 4b: Assuming a perfectly congruent performance measure for tasks a 2 and a 3 and neglecting synergies, the principal prefers unbundling tasks a 1 and a 2 strictly over specialized
The intuition for this result is quite similar to the one described in Lemma 4a. If no congruency problems are associated with tasks a 2 and a 3 , assigning them to one agent is not detrimental and the principal benefits from paying less risk-premium with unbundling synergistic tasks as opposed to the specialized task assignment. Since the congruency problem associated with tasks a 1 and a 2 is still present, the principal's preference of unbundling synergistic tasks over bundling them depends on how strongly this remaining congruency problem is pronounced.
Lemmas 1 to 4b examine extreme cases which isolate single interactions of risk, congruency, and synergies. Based on these observations, we now develop a global comparison of the principal's expected payoff in the different task assignment settings to consider the interaction of all factors collectively.
Intuitively, we expect mixed task assignment with bundling synergistic tasks to be optimal for the principal when taking into account the interactions of risk, congruency, and synergies, since it groups together the synergistic tasks a 1 and a 2 and allows motivating task a 3 separately. Only the specialized task assignment offers this last advantage, but is associated with paying higher risk-premiums. Proposition Proposition 1: Bundling synergistic tasks is optimal if all of the following conditions hold:
(i) risk aversion is above a certain threshold,
(ii) the congruency problem of tasks a 1 and a 2 is not very severe, (iii) the congruency problem of tasks a 2 and a 3 is sufficiently pronounced, and (iv) the synergies between tasks a 1 and a 2 do not exceed a certain threshold.
Due to non-linear parameter combinations in the principal's expected net payoffs, Proposition 1 describes four cut-off values, one for risk, two for congruency, and one for synergies. If the agents' risk aversion is high, mixed task assignment becomes more attractive to the principal, since paying less riskpremium as compared with specialized task assignment yields a larger payoff. In contrast, if the agents' risk aversion is zero, specialized task assignment provides higher returns to the principal (see Lemma 2).
If the synergies between tasks a 1 and a 2 are very high, while ceteris paribus the agents' risk aversion is not too high, specialized task assignment becomes more advantageous for the principal since it allows fine-tuning of incentives on the synergistic tasks. From Corollary 1 follows that it depends on the properties of all parameters whether the principal's expected payoff increases or decreases in the respective sensitivity of the performance measure. E.g., for the case of no synergies (γ ' 0) and a perfectly congruent performance measure with respect to tasks a 1 and a 2 (λ 12 ' 0), the principal's expected payoff increases in m 1 also for the mixed bundling task assignment. Accordingly, for γ ' 0 and λ 23 ' 0, the principal's expected payoff increases in m 3 also for the mixed unbundling task assignment. Finally, for γ ' 0, λ 12 ' 0, and λ 23 ' 0, the principal's expected payoff increases in m 2 for all types of task assignment. Hence, besides risk and synergies, the congruency of the performance measure is relevant for the optimal task assignment.
We provide a numerical example and compare different parameter settings to illustrate the results in Proposition 1. We begin with a setting characterized by a risk aversion of r ' 2, a slight congruency problem between tasks a 1 and a 2 (λ 12 ' 1), a stronger congruency problem between tasks a 2 and a 3 (λ 23 ' 81), and medium synergies of γ ' 0.5 (see Panel A in Table 1 ). In this case, mixed task assignment with bundling synergistic tasks is optimal. By slightly decreasing the risk aversion (Panel B) or increasing the synergies (Panel C) holding everything else constant, the specialized assignment becomes more attractive and is the best choice for the principal. By decreasing the congruency problem between tasks a 2 and a 3 while simultaneously increasing the congruency problem between tasks a 1 and a 2 (Panel D), unbundling synergistic tasks is the best choice for the principal. 
11 A similar setting would occur if there comes up a new task which is related to the new product, e.g., quality control, and the principal needs to assign this task to one of the existing agents. Furthermore, the analysis can be applied to the case when the responsibility for tasks is changed internally.
Impact of Task Assignment on the Variable Pay Ratio
In order to explore the impact of task assignment on the variable pay ratio we assume that starting with three agents and a specialized task assignment, the principal needs to reduce the number of agents from three to two agents because of rationalization constraints. 11 In particular, the agent who performs task 2 is sacked. The principal has now to decide on how to assign task a 2 to the remaining agents. Either she can assign the synergistic tasks a 1 and a 2 to the same agent (mixed bundled) or assign a synergistic and a non-synergistic task, e.g., tasks a 2 and a 3 , to the same agent (mixed unbundled). In both cases, we find one specialist whose individual job situation remains unchanged. If the principal decides to bundle the synergistic tasks, the agent who previously performed task a 3 (specialist 3) is not subject to any changes regarding his job responsibility. In the other case, when the principal unbundles the synergistic tasks, the former agent's job in performing task a 1 (specialist 1) is not affected by this decision. However, even if their jobs remain unchanged, the VPR of these agents is influenced by the principal's reassignment decision.
In a first step, we compare the situation of specialist 3 in the two settings specialized and mixed bundled task assignment. When considering their variable compensation, we observe no changes, i.e. v 3 s † ' v 2 b † . However, the VPR of specialist 3 is subject to changes. For simplicity reasons, we assume identical payoff productivities and sensitivities for comparing the VPRs, i.e.,
1,2,3. A specialist performing a non-synergistic task (a 3 ) then receives a higher VPR when working with a generalist (i.e., in the mixed bundling task assignment) than with other specialists performing the synergistic tasks (i.e., in the specialized task assignment). Since his personal variable compensation is not subject to changes, the differences in the VPRs are due to changes in the variable compensation of the other agent(s) and adjustments in the fixed payment of specialist 3.
In a second step, we compare the situation of specialist 1 in the specialized and mixed unbundled task assignment. Here, we already observe differences in the variable compensation of the two agents, since task a 1 is associated with synergies, i.e., This condition reduces to a simplified congruency measure of tasks a 2 and a 3 if synergies are absent and agents are assumed to be risk neutral. Hence, specialist 1 receives a higher variable compensation when working with other specialists if there is a congruency problem associated with tasks a 2 and a 3 . In this case, the principal fine-tunes incentives on these two tasks with specialized task assignment which also results in a higher variable compensation for specialist 1. Consequently, the VPR of specialist 1 is subject to changes as well when the principal switches from specialized to mixed unbundled task assignment.
Comparing the VPRs for specialist 1 with identical payoff productivities and sensitivities yields a similar result as for specialist 3 in the previous scenario. A specialist performing a synergistic task receives a higher VPR when working with a generalist than with other specialists. In addition to changes in the variable compensation of the other agent(s) and specialist 1's fixed compensation, now the differences in VPRs are also caused by changes in the variable compensation of specialist 1.
From combining the results obtained in the previous chapters with respect to the VPRs with the two comparisons follows, that a manager's VPR depends on three factors: (1) the type and number of tasks he performs, (2) the compensation of his coworkers, and (3) how tasks are assigned to the coworkers.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we analyze the assignment of synergistic tasks to risk-averse agents when only an aggregate performance measure is available for incentive contracting that does not reflect task synergies.
The basic trade-off for the principal is characterized by the interaction of risk, congruency issues, and task synergies. We find that -under specific circumstances -it is optimal for the principal to hire two agents and assign tasks in a way which bundles synergistic tasks. However, firms with highly synergistic tasks can be better off by assigning them to different agents, i.e., choosing mixed unbundling or specialized task assignment (as long as risk aversion is not too high). This approach is, e.g., followed by Microsoft.
Steven Sinofsky, president of the Windows division, decided to organize software engineers in small Furthermore, we analyze the variable pay ratio for agents in the different task assignment settings.
We find that the VPR depends on three factors: (1) the number and type of tasks a manager is responsible for, (2) the variable compensation of other managers, and (3) how the principal decides to assign tasks to these other managers. Generally, a manager's VPR decreases in his own productivity and increases in the other agent's productivity. With specialized task assignment, the agents' VPRs are of identical structure but differ dependent on the synergies incorporated in the output. Mixed task assignment allows to compare the VPRs of single-task agents (specialists) and two-task agents (generalists). We find that with identical payoff productivities and sensitivities, the two-task agent receives a lower VPR than the single-task agent, which is contrary to what we observe in practice.
